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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
DAVID C. STREETER, : Case No. 930206-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a 
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion. 
Emphasis added. 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
eniov the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
Emphas is added. 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
testify against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for 
the same offense. 
Emphasis added. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether police misconduct requires that David 
Streeter's statements be suppressed? 
Standard of review - CORRECTION OF ERROR. Factual 
findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a 
motion to suppress evidence are reviewed using a clearly erroneous 
standard. The court's conclusions of law based on those facts are 
reviewed using a correctness standard. State v. Brown, 201 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 4, 6 (1992). The facts here are undisputed; the court's 
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. "[T]he trial 
court's ultimate conclusions concerning the waiver of defendant's 
Miranda rights, which conclusions were based upon essentially 
undisputed facts, in particular the transcript of [an officer's] 
colloquy with defendant, present questions of law reviewable under 
a correction-of-error standard." State v. Sampson, 808 P. 2d 1100, 
1103 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991), and 
cert, denied, U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992). 
"If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney 
and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to 
demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived 
his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained 
counsel." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724 (1966). "[A]ny evidence that the accused 
was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, 
3 
show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege." 
Id. at 476, 16 L.Ed.2d at 725. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that David 
Streeter knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right 
to counsel? 
Standard of review - CORRECTION OF ERROR. See standard 
of review for issue number one. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
David Streeter was arrested in the early morning hours of 
September 22, 1990 as a result of certain alleged assaults that had 
occurred that morning. R. 228. He was interrogated by Detective 
Cowley, but invoked his right to counsel immediately upon being 
Mirandized. After some threatening statements by Detective Cowley, 
and three additional invocations of the right to counsel and 
silence by David, the interrogation was terminated. See transcript 
of interrogations, pp. 1-2, Exhibit 1 at the motion to suppress 
hearing (hereafter "Transcript").1 
The police took no action whatsoever with respect to 
David's request that his mother be telephoned to obtain counsel, or 
to obtain other counsel. R. 197:11-14, 201:25-202:8, 204:16-25. 
XA copy is attached as Addendum A. Although the transcript 
does not make it clear, the first two pages constitute the first 
interrogation. Page three begins the second interrogation, some 
two hours later. See R. 191-2. 
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Approximately two hours later, Detective Cowley was 
informed that David wanted to speak with him. R. 213, 215. David 
was not re-Mirandized. However, he did indicate that he desired to 
speak without counsel at that time. See Transcript, p. 3. David 
subsequently made incriminating statements. See Transcript, pp. 3-
10. 
David Streeter was initially charged with aggravated 
assault (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990), 3rd degree felony), 
conspiracy (Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-201 (1990) , class A misdemeanor) , 
and assault (Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1990), class B misdemean-
or) . R. 8-10. An amended information charged him with three 
counts of attempted homicide (Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 and 76-5-
2 03 (1990), 2nd degree felony), and one count of aggravated assault. 
Mr. Streeter filed a motion to suppress his statements. 
R. 67-68, as amended, R. 71-2. This motion was heard on September 
23 and 25, 1991. See transcript of suppression hearing, R. 181-
257. The motion to suppress was denied. R. Ill (minute entry), R. 
112-116 (memorandum decision). 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, David pled guilty to 
aggravated assault, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his 
motion to suppress pursuant to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah 
5 
App. 1988) . Counts II and III were dismissed.2 See R. 161-7 
(statement of defendant), R. 170 (minute entry). 
Judge Jay E. Banks3 ordered a ninety day evaluation prior 
to sentencing. R. 171-2. David was sentenced to a prison term of 
0 to 5 years, and ordered to pay restitution. R. 175. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
David Streeter4 was arrested in the early morning hours 
(5:15 A.M.) of Saturday, September 22, 1990. R. 18. At approxi-
mately 8:30-9:00 A.M., David was interrogated by Detective Cowley. 
R. 189-190. After being Mirandized, David immediately invoked his 
rights to silence and/or counsel: 
2The parties appear to have been referring to the original 
information, rather than the amended information. This technical 
error is without import. The reference to aggravated assault as a 
lesser included offense shows the plea was contemplated with 
reference to the amended information, and the parties clearly 
intended a plea to aggravated assault committed against Craig 
Mortensen, with the other (severed) charges dismissed. 
3Sitting by designation. R. 169. 
4David, d.o.b. 9/14/72 (R. 6, 7, 8, etc.), was arrested less 
than 8 days after his eighteenth birthday. The record further 
discloses: 
Mr. Streeter looks brighter than he is. He received a 
Beta II score [IQ] of 91, which places him in the lower 
part of the average range of intelligence. His school 
achievement scores are even worse. He reads at a fifth 
grade level, spells at the seventh grade level, and does 
arithmetic at the seventh grade level. He dropped out of 
high school in the eleventh grade . . . 
Psychological Evaluation, p. 1, attached to Diagnostic Evaluation 
Report (in court file in sealed envelope). This information 
obviously has direct bearing on David's ability to understand his 
rights, and make a knowing waiver of them. 
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TC5: Having these rights in mind do you wish to 
speak with us now without an attorney present? 
DS6: No. 
Transcript, p. 1. The interrogation was not terminated. Rather, 
Detective Cowley continued, attempted to cajole David into making 
a statement, and threatened him: 
TC: You don't want to talk to us? 
DS: I don't know why I am really even in here. All I 
was doing was sleeping over at my friends lawn last 
night and the cops just come ripping in the yard 
and arrested us and 
TC: Well we have a bunch of questions we would like to 
ask you, would you be willing to answer those 
questions without a lawyer present [?] 
DS: Maybe some of them. It just depends cause I really 
don't know why I am here. 
TC: So does that mean we can ask you questions and you 
will answer the ones you want to answer? 
DS: Yes[,] I have the right to stop at any time though. 
TC: Well, I'll tell you right now that if you take that 
attitude with us. 
DS: Well I ain't trying to 
TC: Because we have all the witnesses we need and we 
know who has done what and who has done what to 
who. So I want the truth out of you and I want it 
now. Now do you understand that? 
DS: Yes [.] 
TC: Who were you with tonight [?] 
Transcript, p. 1. David responded by reinvoking his right to 
counsel: 
5Detective Cowley. 
6David Streeter. 
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DS: Some of my friends, I want my lawyer here, all you 
have to do is call my mom and he will be down here. 
TC: You want your attorney? 
DS: Yes. 
DS: And you don't want to talk to us? 
DS: Yes. 
TC: O.K. 
Id. Only at this point, after four invocations of his constitu-
tional rights, was the interrogation terminated. David was 
returned to a holding cell. R. 211-2. 
Detective Cowley made no attempt to comply with David's 
request that his mother be telephoned to obtain counsel. R. 
197:11-14. Detective Cowley did nothing to attempt to locate an 
attorney for David, and did nothing to attempt to have someone else 
obtain an attorney for him. R. 201:25-202:8, 204:16-25. 
Two hours later, David broke down and informed Officer 
Robert Dey that he wanted to speak with Det. Cowley. Officer Dey 
took David to an interrogation room for this purpose. R. 230, 234. 
Detective Cowley did not re-Mirandize David. R. 205:23-
206:7, 217:14-23. The second interrogation proceeded: 
TC: Do you recall earlier that I had advised you of 
your rights? 
DS: Yes [.] 
TC: And after being advised of your rights you said 
that you wanted to talk to a lawyer? 
DS: Yes [.] 
TC: Now it is your desire and you come forth voluntari-
ly that you want to talk to me now? 
DS: Yes [.] 
TC: And you want to talk to me without a lawyer? 
DS: Yes [.] 
TC: Go ahead. 
Transcript, p. 3. David thereafter made incriminating statements. 
See Transcript, pp. 3-10. 
Pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P. 2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) , 
David pled guilty to aggravated assault and now appeals the denial 
of his motion to suppress. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Detective Cowley illegally failed to honor David 
Streeter's invocation of rights. David indicated in unequivocal 
terms that he would not submit to interrogation without the 
presence of an attorney. This invocation was not scrupulously 
honored. Detective Cowley continued to interrogate, and attempted 
to cajole David into retreating from his position and into waiving 
his rights. David was threatened. Interrogation was not 
terminated until after David had invoked his rights for the fourth 
time. Finally, the police did nothing to comply with David's 
request that his mother be called to obtain his attorney. David 
was not given access to a telephone, and no call was made on his 
behalf. David's subsequent "initiation" of subsequent 
interrogation and purported "waiver" of his rights were the direct 
product of the prior taint of this police illegality. David's 
statements must be suppressed. 
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The totality of the circumstances do not support a 
conclusion that David knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his rights at the second interrogation. David was not re-
Mirandized. His understanding of his rights was irreparably 
colored and tainted by Detective Cowley's failure to respect his 
rights. The State has failed to show that, subsequent to the 
police misconduct, David understood his rights correctly, or that 
he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived those rights. 
David's statements must be suppressed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. POLICE MISCONDUCT REQUIRES THAT 
DAVID STREETER'S STATEMENTS BE 
SUPPRESSED. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) the United States Supreme Court set forth a 
simple mandate for the protection of an accused's constitutional 
rights: 
[W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in[-]custody 
interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime 
contains inherently compelling pressures which work to 
undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel 
him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. 
In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full 
opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-
incrimination, the accused must be adequately and 
effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of 
those rights must be fully honored. 
Id. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at , 16 L.Ed.2d at 719. 
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent 
procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any 
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that 
he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. 
At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise 
10 
his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after 
the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the 
product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Without the 
right to cut off questioning, the setting of in-custody 
interrogation operates on the individual to overcome free 
choice in producing a statement after the privilege has 
been once invoked. If the individual states that he 
wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an 
attorney is present. At that time, the individual must 
have an opportunity to confer with the attorney and to 
have him present during any subsequent questioning. If 
the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates 
that he wants one before speaking to police, they must 
respect his decision to remain silent. 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S. Ct. at , 16 L.Ed. 2d at 719 
(emphasis added, footnote omitted). 
While in custody, the protections of Miranda attach to 
any interrogation on any subject. Mathis v. United States, 391 
U.S. 1, 4-5, 88 S.Ct. 1503, , 20 L.Ed.2d 381, 385 (1968). There 
can be no dispute that David Streeter was in custody. The record 
is undisputed that prior to and in between interrogations, David 
Streeter was detained in a holding cell. R. 228-30. See also R. 
18 (indicating David was arrested at 5:15 A.M., over three hours 
prior to his interrogation). 
A. THE POLICE FAILED TO "SCRUPULOUSLY 
HONOR"7 DAVID STREETER'S INVOCATION 
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO 
COUNSEL AND SILENCE. 
The police in this case failed to follow Miranda's simple 
mandate. When asked, "Having these rights in mind do you wish to 
speak with us now without an attorney present?", David responded 
7See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 
16 L.Ed.2d 694, 726 (1966). 
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with an emphatic "No." This clear, unequivocal invocation of 
constitutional rights was ignored by the police. 
The police are entitled to clarification of an equivocal 
request for counsel. State v. Griffin, 754 P. 2d 965, 969 (Utah 
App. 1988) . David Streeter's response of "No." when asked "do you 
wish to speak with us now without an attorney present" was not in 
the least bit equivocal. Compare People v. St. Pierre, 522 N.E.2d 
61, 66-8 (111. 1988) ("Q. Do you wish one [an attorney] ? A. Yes." 
held unequivocal invocation, follow-up "clarification" could not 
render invocation ambiguous); see also Commonwealth v. Zook, 553 
A.2d 920 (Pa), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 873, 110 S. Ct. 203, 107 
L.Ed.2d 156 (1989), discussed infra at 12, 20. At most, there is 
a question whether David is invoking the right to counsel, the 
right to silence, or both. Regardless of which situation pertains, 
the police were obligated to immediately terminate the 
interrogation. 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Detective 
Cowley tried to show that in fact the continuation of the interro-
gation was merely clarification: 
A. [by Det. Cowley] I said, "Having these rights 
in mind, do you wish to speak to us now without having an 
attorney present?" 
Q. And what was Mr. Streeter's response? 
A. He said, "No." 
Q. That answer was unequivocal, wasn't it? 
A. That's right, 
Q. It required no clarification, did it? 
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A, Well, in my mind it did. 
Q. All right. Well, what words did he say, 
detective Cowley, after the word no that indicated to you 
that that was not [un]equivocal? What words? 
A. Right after no? He didn't say anything. 
Q. All right. So he indicated to you that he does 
not wish to go forward without an attorney being present, 
correct? 
A. He said, "No." 
Q. And he said nothing further; we have got that 
clear, right? 
A. That's right. 
Q. All right. And vet vou continued with this 
interrogation, did you not? 
A. I wanted to clarify and that's why I asked him 
the next question, 
R. 195:2-25 (emphasis added). 
No means no. The only point that could possibly be 
clarified was whether David had invoked the right to silence, the 
right to counsel, or both. In any instance, the police were 
required to terminate the interrogation. 
The Transcript does not reveal David's initial invocation 
to be equivocal. Subsequent responses do not alter this result. 
"Under Miranda and Edwards, however, an accused's postrequest 
responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast doubt on 
the clarity of his initial request for counsel." Smith v. 
Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 92, 105 S.Ct. 490, , 83 L.Ed.2d 488, 491 
(1984) (per curiam); accord Sampson, 808 P.2d at 1111 ("The fact 
that defendant continued to answer questions was not a sufficient 
indication that he was abandoning his right to counsel."). 
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Edwards set forth a "bright-line rule" that all question-
ing must cease after an accused requests counsel. Solem 
v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 79 L.Ed.2d 
579 (1984) . In the absence of such a bright-line 
prohibition, the authorities through "badger[ing]" or 
"overreaching"--explicit or subtle, deliberate or 
unintentional--might otherwise wear down the accused and 
persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his 
earlier request for counsel's assistance. Oregon v. 
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 
405 (1983); Fare v. Michael C.. 442 U.S. [707,] 719, 99 
S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 [(1979)] . With respect to the 
waiver inquiry, we accordingly have emphasized that a 
valid waiver "cannot be established by showing only that 
[the accused] responded to further police-initiated 
custodial interrogation." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 
[477,] 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 [(1981)]. 
Using an accused's subsequent responses to cast doubt on 
the adequacy of the initial request itself is even more 
intolerable. "No authority, and no logic, permits the 
interrogator to proceed . . . on his own terms and as if 
the defendant had requested nothing, in the hope that the 
defendant might be induced to say something casting 
retrospective doubt on his initial statement that he 
wished to speak through an attorney or not at all." 
fPeople v. Smith,] 102 111.2d [365,] 376, 466 N.E.2d 
[236,] 241 [(1984)] (Simon, J., dissenting). 
Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. at 98-100, 105 S.Ct. at , 83 L.Ed.2d 
at 495-6 (footnote omitted). 
Detective Cowley wasn't trying to clarify; rather, he was 
attempting to get David to recant his unequivocal invocation of 
constitutional rights: 
TC: You don't want to talk to us? 
DS: I don't really know why I am even in here. All I 
was doing was sleeping over at my friends lawn last 
night and the cops just come ripping in the yard 
and arrested us and 
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TC: Well we have a bunch of questions we would like to 
ask you, would you be willing to answer those 
questions without a lawyer present [?] [8] 
DS: Maybe some of them. It just depends cause I really 
don't know why I am here. 
TC: So does that mean we can ask you questions and you 
will answer the ones you want to answer? 
DS: Yes[,] I have the right to stop at any time though. 
TC: Well, I'll tell you right now that if you take that 
attitude with us. 
DS: Well I ain't trying to 
TC: Because we have all the witnesses we need and we 
know who has done what and who has done what to 
who. So I want the truth out of you and I want it 
now. Now do you understand that? 
DS: Yes [.] 
TC: Who were you with tonight [?] [93 
Transcript, p. 1. 
This further questioning by the detective was not 
directed at clarification. Instead, he threatened David, and did 
his utmost to convince and persuade him to give a statement despite 
8This question doesn't even address the possible ambiguity of 
whether David was invoking his right to counsel, silence, or both. 
The only possible responses to this question are a repeat of the 
prior invocation of rights (resulting in no clarification), or a 
retreat from Mr. Streeter's prior position (again, providing no 
clarification). Detective Cowley wasn't seeking clarification; 
instead he was seeking a retreat from David's prior invocation of 
rights. 
9This question is substantive interrogation. Leaving aside 
the issue of police persuasion, as of this point the police must 
assert that all necessary clarification has occurred. See Griffin, 
754 P.2d at 969 ("If, however, the accused, absent police persua-
sion, indicates he does not want counsel present at that time, the 
interrogation may continue."). However, as of this point in time 
no clarification had occurred. 
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his invocation of rights. This colloquy only clarified that 
Detective Cowley was not going to respect David's invocation, and 
wanted a statement right then and there. 
Giving the State the benefit of the doubt and assuming 
arguendo that David's request was equivocal, conduct of this type 
has been roundly condemned by this Court: 
The main problem inherent in the clarification 
approach is "the additional opportunity given to law 
enforcement officials to . . . [use] clarifying ques-
tions to dissuade" suspects from asserting their right to 
counsel. [Note, Judicial Approaches to the Ambiguous 
Request for Counsel, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 460 (1987)] at 
472. See Anderson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96, 104 n.9 (2nd 
Cir. 1984); Daniel v. State. 644 P.2d 172, 177 (Wyo. 
1982) (permissible for officer to "seek clarification of 
the suspect's desires, as long as he does not disguise 
the clarification as a subterfuge for coercion or 
intimidation") . See also Thompson v. Wainwricrht, 601 
F.2d 768, 771-2 (5th Cir. 1979) (during purported effort 
to clarify, officer asserted that obtaining counsel may 
not be in defendant's best interest); Hampel v. State. 
706 P. 2d 1173, 1182 (Alaska App. 1985) (during purported 
effort to clarify, officer emphasized delay and complexi-
ty of obtaining an attorney). 
One commentator has suggested that only one 
question should be permitted to seek clarification. With 
our embellishment in the form of an introductory state-
ment, that question is as follows: You have been advised 
of your rights, including the right to have an attorney 
with you during this interview even if you cannot afford 
to hire one. What you just said leads me to wonder 
whether or not you wish to avail yourself of that right. 
"Do you want the assistance of [an attorney] at this time 
or do you agree to answer questions without the presence 
of [an attorney]?" Comment, Equivocal Requests for 
Counsel: A Balance of Competing Policy Considerations, 
55 Cine.L.Rev. 767, 782 (1987). 
State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100, 1111 n.18 (Utah App. 1990), cert. 
denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah 1991) , and cert, denied, U.S. , 112 
S.Ct. 1282, 117 L.Ed.2d 507 (1992). See also Martin v. State, 557 
So.2d 622, 625 (Fla. App. 1990) ("At the very least the Detective 
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was required to take a neutral stance on whether [defendant] needed 
counsel. Any other conclusion would vitiate the protections which 
are to be supplied by Miranda.") ; People v. Gaddy, 135 A.D.2d 1082, 
523 N.Y.S.2d 301, 302 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (improper to tell 
defendant that stepchild would be placed in a shelter if he wanted 
an attorney); White v. State, 674 P.2d 31, 36 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1983) (improper to attempt to dissuade prisoner from exercising 
right to counsel by threatening the death penalty and saying no 
attorney would be needed if defendant were not guilty). 
The police conduct here runs afoul of Griffin, Sampson, 
and Miranda. David Streeter's invocation of his constitutional 
rights was not "scrupulously honored." The interrogation should 
have ceased immediately when David evidenced his refusal to proceed 
without an attorney. Instead, David had to invoke his rights four 
times before Detective Cowley reluctantly complied. 
B. THE POLICE FAILED TO CALL DAVID 
STREETER'S ATTORNEY OR PROVIDE HIM 
ACCESS TO A TELEPHONE. 
In response to improper continued interrogation after 
invoking his constitutional rights, David said "I want my lawyer 
here, all you have to do is call my mom and he will be down here." 
Transcript, p. 2. The police completely ignored this request. 
Detective Cowley did not call David's mother to obtain Mr. 
Streeter's attorney. R. 202:6-8,10 204:23-25.X1 Detective Cowley 
10
 Q. Did you call his mother as he had suggested you do 
so that she might contact an attorney? 
A. I did not. 
17 
did not have anyone else attempt to get David an attorney. R. 
204:20-22.12 Police action or inaction that prevents a defendant 
from obtaining counsel in a timely fashion violates a defendant's 
right to counsel. State v. Moore. 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985).13 
California has found the right to use of a telephone to 
be of constitutional dimension. In People v. Locke, 152 Cal.App.3d 
1130, 200 Cal.Rptr 20 (Cal. App. 1984), defendant was detained in 
connection with an attempted homicide. After being read her 
rights, she invoked her right to counsel. She remained in the 
officer's presence for the next three hours. The officer respected 
her invocation of rights, but did nothing to obtain an attorney or 
provide access to a phone. After three hours, she was transferred 
to the custody of another officer. Defendant was re-Mirandized, 
and again invoked her right to counsel. Again, nothing was done 
concerning her request for counsel, but her rights were otherwise 
respected. After a time defendant began to sob, and the officer 
11
 Q. Did you call either of Mr. Streeter's parents as Mr. 
Streeter indicated he wanted you to do? 
A. No, I did not. 
12
 Q. What did you do to attempt to have anyone else 
obtain an attorney for him? 
A. I didn't do anything. 
13Miranda recognizes that "If authorities conclude that they 
will not provide counsel during a reasonable period of time in 
which investigation in the field is carried out, they may refrain 
from doing so without violating the person's Fifth Amendment 
privilege so long as they do not question him during that time." 
Id. , 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S. Ct. at , 16 L.Ed.2d at 724. The State 
has presented no evidence here that any continuing investigation 
was underway; rather it appears that counsel was denied solely in 
hopes that David might break down and make incriminating 
statements. 
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attempted to console her. Defendant then made incriminating 
statements, which were admitted at trial. The jury conviction was 
reversed: 
A Miranda explanation of one's rights must be 
meaningfully implemented, in order that the constitution-
al purpose be served. We are of the opinion, under the 
facts and circumstances of a case such as this, that a 
minimal requirement is that the arrested suspect be told 
of his or her right, and be given an opportunity, to use 
a telephone for the purpose of securing the desired 
attorney. Such telephone calls should be allowed 
immediately upon request, or as soon thereafter as 
practicable. Anything less would make of Miranda a 
hollow ineffectual pretense. 
We accordingly find prejudicial error of 
constitutional dimension. 
Locke, 152 Cal. App.3d at 1133, 200 Cal.Rptr at 22 (cites omitted). 
One court has commented on the inappropriateness of a 
delay of even so much as one hour in providing access to a 
telephone: 
Legitimate security concerns may have prompted the 
arresting agents to deny [defendant] Guido's initial 
request to call his attorney while still at the apartment 
where he was arrested. But we see no valid reasons apart 
from administrative convenience to prevent a suspect from 
calling his attorney once he is brought to a courthouse 
for processing. In our view, the accused's interest in 
obtaining the prompt assistance of counsel outweighs any 
such administrative concerns. In this case, we see no 
substantial evidence in the record to suggest that the 
officers delayed Guido's access to an attorney in the 
hope that he might incriminate himself. Moreover, Guido 
was allowed to call his attorney within approximately one 
to one-and-a-half hours of his arrest. Under these 
circumstances, we cannot say the delay was egregious. 
Nonetheless, we think the better procedure would have 
been to permit Guido to call his attorney on Guido's 
arrival at the [ ] courthouse, and we expect that such 
requests will be so honored in the future. 
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United States v. Guido, 704 F.2d 675, 678 (2nd Cir. 1983). Here, 
it appears that the police may have delayed telephonic access 
precisely in hopes that David might incriminate himself. 
Requests to call attorneys should be granted without 
delay: 
We do not view Lt. Landis' continued questioning as 
intended to clarify Appellant's desires respecting 
counsel. What, in Appellant's request, needs clarifica-
tion? What was equivocal or ambiguous? Appellant 
reportedly said, "Can I use the phone to call my mother 
to see if she can get me an attorney?" to paraphrase Lt. 
Landis' testimony. The only acceptable response from the 
police should have been "YES"! Not, "are you saying you 
want us to stop questioning you until you have an 
attorney present?" 
Commonwealth v. Zook, 553 A.2d 920, 923 (Pa.), cert, denied, 493 
U.S. 873, 110 S.Ct. 203, 107 L.Ed.2d 156 (1989). David Streeter's 
request deserved equal dignity, and immediate access to a phone. 
See also Singleton v. State, 344 So.2d 911, 912-3 (Fla. App. 1977) 
(defendant should have been given opportunity to phone when she 
stated, "Maybe I had better ask my mother if I should get [an 
attorney].") 
See also People v. Spivev, 568 N.E.2d 327 (111. App. 
1991), discussed infra at 28, dealing with "incommunicado interro-
gation" as a Miranda violation. 
David Streeter was improperly denied an opportunity to 
use a telephone to obtain an attorney. 
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C. THE POLICE THREATENED DAVID 
STREETER. 
After David Streeter had invoked his right to counsel and 
silence, Detective Cowley's "clarification" resulted in the 
following exchange: 
TC: So does that mean we can ask you questions and you 
will answer the ones you want to answer? 
DS: Yes[,] I have the right to stop at any time though. 
TC: Well, I'll tell vou right now that if vou take that 
attitude with us. 
DS: Well I ain't trying to 
TC: Because we have all the witnesses we need and we 
know who has done what and who has done what to 
who. So I want the truth out of vou and I want it 
now. Now do vou understand that? 
DS: Yes [.] 
TC: Who were you with tonight [?] 
Transcript at p. 2 (emphasis added). Miranda clearly requires that 
an accused be permitted to terminate an interrogation at any time. 
"If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or 
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interroga-
tion must cease." Id. , 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at , 16 L.Ed.2d 
at 719. When David sought assurance that he could terminate 
interrogation at any time, the police instead threatened him and 
indicated that such conduct would have some unspecified dire 
consequences. As of this point in the interrogation, Detective 
Cowley's "clarification" has just confirmed that David Streeter 
does NOT have the right to terminate questioning without further 
sanction. This conduct is illegal and inexcusable. Miranda 
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requires that the accused be accurately informed of their rights. 
The police cannot thereafter indicate that these rights do not 
exist without tainting the initial warnings. 
At the hearing on David's motion to suppress, Detective 
Cowley understandably denied that his statements were threatening: 
Q. All right. Detective Cowley, your next 
question to him, as indicated in this transcript is, 
"I'll tell you right now if you take that attitude with 
us" and then you stop, isn't that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. All right. In other words you were telling him 
that if he indicated an attitude that he would only 
answer some of the questions or none of the questions you 
apparently were going to do something. What was it? 
A. I can't recall. 
Q. But your words were-- would you consider these 
words a threat, "I tell you right now if you take that 
attitude with us"? 
A. In my opinion, no, that's not a threat. 
Q. Then what is the explanation of that term? 
MS. BYRNE: The question is asked and answered, 
your honor. I don't think there's any point in continu-
ing to badger this witness. 
MS. WELLS: I don't think this is badgering, 
your honor. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. 
Q. (BY MS. WELLS) If it was not a threat, 
Detective Cowley, what is the-- what was the meaning of 
your question to him, "I'll tell you right now, if you 
take that attitude with us"? 
A. Apparently I wanted to clarify and tell him 
that if he wanted to answer certain questions and not 
answer others that we were interested in finding answers 
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to and the way he was acting at that time, apparently 
that's why I said it. C14] 
Q. So your previous response that you asked him or 
told him that you-- if he took a certain type of attitude 
with you was said in order to clarify his response isn't 
followed up with any clarifying questions is it, Detec-
tive? 
A. No. 
Q. In fact what it's followed up with is another 
type of threat, isn't it? "We have all the witnesses we 
need and we know who has done what to who." Isn't that 
right? 
A. That's a statement of fact. It's not a threat. 
R. 198:14-199:19, 200:17-201:3. Statement of fact or otherwise, 
these statements are clearly threatening in nature. They do not 
accurately indicate, as Miranda requires, that David has the 
absolute right to terminate the interrogation at any time for any 
reason without fear of reprisal or other adverse consequence. As 
a result of these threats, David Streeter's rights were not 
scrupulously honored. 
D. DAVID STREETER'S STATEMENTS MUST BE 
SUPPRESSED AS THE DIRECT PRODUCT OF 
THE TAINT OF PRIOR POLICE 
ILLEGALITY. 
As a result of the police misconduct in failing to honor 
David Streeter's rights, failing to phone or provide access to a 
phone, and threatening David, his statements must be suppressed. 
14An interesting response. The words are all there, but they 
don't say anything. The reason is clear: this statement was a 
threat, but Detective Cowley is unwilling to admit it. 
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Collazo v. Estelle. 940 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1991) (en 
banc) is on all fours with this case. The Ninth Circuit introduces 
the case as follows: 
Appellant Collazo was arrested for murder and 
advised of his Miranda rights. He declined to waive 
them, asking instead to talk to a lawyer. The police 
responded to his request by telling Collazo it "might be 
worse" for him if he talked to an attorney, and that it 
was in his best interest to talk to them without one. 
Three hours later, [153 he "changed his mind," was 
readvised of his rights, [16] and talked to the police. 
What he told them was used to convict him and send him to 
prison. . . . We conclude that Collazo's confession was 
involuntary, and that its use to convict him violated his 
Constitutional rights. 
Id. at 413. After Mr. Collazo requested counsel, the colloquy 
between Mr. Collazo and Officer Destro continued: 
Collazo: Oh, you know, ah, can I, you know, 
talk to a lawyer? 
Destro: It's up to you. This is your last 
chance to talk to us, though. 
Collazo: I understand that. 
Destro: Once you get a lawyer, he's gonna say 
forget it. You know, don't talk to the police. 
Then it might be worse for you. 
Collazo: Pardon me? 
Destro: Then it might be worse for you. 
Collazo: Why? 
Destro: Because, ah, you know, there's other 
people involved in this thing, and we would like to 
15Unlike the present case, Collazo was given access to a phone 
and talked to his wife. The incommunicado nature of David's 
detention makes reversal more compelling here. 
16Unlike this case, where David was not readvised of his 
complete rights. This distinction only makes reversal in this case 
more compelling. 
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get everybody. If you don't want to talk about it, 
uh--
Rolen: Well, he's asked for a lawyer, so why 
don't we, I guess we'll end our interview right 
there. 
Collazo: If, ah, if ah, this gonna be stupid 
for you, you know, for me it means a lot, you know. 
Destro: If you're arrested for murder, it 
does mean a lot. 
The police then departed, leaving Collazo in the 
interview room to ponder Officer Destro's inappropriate 
admonition and to consider whether he could afford to 
exercise his Constitutional rights. 
Id. at 414. The Ninth Circuit, en banc, analyzes this police 
conduct in detail, Id. at 416-419, and concludes: 
Based on the foregoing, our plenary review of 
the tactics used by Officer Destro in an attempt to 
pressure Collazo into talking to his adversaries leads us 
to a two-part conclusion. First, Officer Destro's 
tactics add up to a flagrant breach of the prophylactic 
rules established by the Supreme Court in Miranda and its 
progeny to protect a defendant's Constitutional right 
against self-incrimination. Second, Officer Destro's 
overreaching behavior violated not only Miranda, but also 
the general Constitutional prohibition against coercive 
interrogation practices likely to result in involuntary 
responses. Officer Destro's gambit was inconsistent with 
Collazo's Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination as well as his right to consult an 
attorney. His inquisitorial stratagem was calculated to 
break Collazo's will. As such, it offends due process as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Collazo, 940 F.2d at 419-20. 
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Having found initial illegality,17 the court went on to 
determine that Collazo's decision to initiate further contact with 
the detectives was the product of this initial taint: 
It is readily apparent from the historical 
facts that Collazo's "change of mind"--including his 
alleged Miranda waiver--was the direct product of the 
primary illegality in this case. Officer Destro's 
strategy was successful. Collazo caved in. There is 
nothing of substance to demonstrate otherwise. There was 
"no break in the stream of events . . . sufficient to 
insulate the statement from the effect of all that went 
before." Clewis [v. Texasl , 386 U.S. [707,] 710, 87 
S.Ct. [1338,] 1340[, 18 L.Ed.2d 423, 427 (1967)]. Under 
the circumstances, Officer Rolen's readvice of rights and 
Collazo's alleged waiver thereof was an empty ceremony. 
Collazo, 940 F.2d at 422-3. 
The present case is, if anything, more egregious than 
Collazo. David was of a tender age, with only a fifth grade 
reading level. Like Collazo, David was threatened. His invocation 
of the right to counsel was ignored. Unlike Collazo, David was not 
re-Mirandized in full, and was not provided access to a telephone. 
Finally, David caved in after only two hours, rather than three in 
Collazo. The taint from the police misconduct is therefore even 
less attenuated here than in Collazo. At the second interrogation, 
the incomplete "readvice of rights and [David]'s alleged waiver 
thereof [were] an empty ceremony." For precisely the reasons given 
in Collazo, David's statements must be suppressed here. 
17As was found in this case (R. 237:1-7): 
MS. WELLS: . . . It's our position, Your 
Honor, that during the initial interview conducted by 
Detective Cowley, that upon-- when the defendant 
indicated No, the very first time, that the interview 
should have stopped at that point. 
THE COURT: There's no question about that. 
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United States v. Chapdelaine, 616 F.Supp. 522 (D. R.I. 
1985) is also illustrative. Chapdelaine was arrested for drug 
trafficking. Id. at 523. He was advised of his rights at the 
police station, whereupon he requested that his attorney be 
summoned, but was not permitted any access to a telephone. 
Chapdelaine was then asked for consent to search his vehicle, but 
he declined. Chapdelaine was subsequently questioned. Id. at 529-
30. 
As evidence that Chapdelaine had waived his right to an 
attorney, the State presented evidence that he had initiated 
contact with an officer. The court noted: 
The government has stressed, with considerable 
fanfare, the fact that the defendant had been given his 
Miranda warnings by [an officer] early on, and thus knew 
that he had a right not to talk with [officer] McCarthy. 
But, Miranda requires not only that a defendant be 
informed of his rights, but that the police behave in a 
manner consistent with those rights. Thus, a defendant 
who is abstractly aware of his Miranda rights (and with 
the popularity of police shows on television, there are 
few persons who are not familiar with the litany) must 
also be assured that they will be respected in his 
situation. 
. . . Even if, as the government would have 
it, McCarthy's interrogation came about in consequence of 
Chapdelaine's invitation, the prosecution has not 
convincingly refuted Chapdelaine's claim that he request-
ed an attorney, nor has it offered any substantial 
evidence whatsoever to indicate that, as Edwards demands 
in such circumstances, he knowingly and intelligently 
abandoned his right to counsel and his right to silence. 
The court must also note that the 
circumstances of this case do not readily suggest a 
waiver. This defendant was arrested at gunpoint and 
taken to the police station. There, he was confronted by 
a veritable array of officers from several different law 
enforcement agencies, accompanied by the United States 
Attorney. Despite his requests to be allowed to call his 
attorney, he was not permitted to do so until his 
arraignment the following day. Under the circumstances, 
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any withdrawal of the defendant's original insistence 
that his attorney be present should not be lightly 
inferred. 
Chapdelaine. 616 F.Supp. at 530-1. 
The situation here is similar. David Streeter was asleep 
in a friend's yard when "the cops just come ripping in the yard and 
arrested us . . . " Transcript p. 1. David was interrogated in the 
presence of Detective Cowley, Officer Allen Call, Deputy Sterner, 
and possibly Officer Bob Dey. R. 206:8-10. David asked that his 
mother be called to obtain counsel, but no call was made and he was 
not provided access to a phone. Finally, his invocations of 
constitutional rights were ignored by the police. As in 
Chapdelaine, David Streeter's statements must be suppressed. 
People v. Spivey. 568 N.E.2d 327 (111. App. 1991) also 
has marked similarities to this case. Spivey, a 17 year old, was 
questioned in a hospital in the presence of his parents, and 
invoked his right to silence and to an attorney. He was later 
arrested, and was not permitted to speak with his parents or an 
attorney.18 Spivey was Mirandized, "waived" his rights, and made 
incriminating statements. The Illinois Court of Appeals reversed: 
[D]efendant's pre-arrest invocation of his fifth amend-
ment rights to remain silent and to have an attorney 
present was ignored immediately following his arrest, and 
that notwithstanding the Miranda warnings, the police 
created a coercive environment to obtain the statements 
by subjecting defendant to incommunicado incarceration. 
Such police action and conduct caused defendant's 
statements to be taken in violation of his constitutional 
rights. 
18The police went so far as to deny that Spivey was present at 
the police station. See 566 N.E.2d at 329, 333. 
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Id. at 334. 
More specifically, the court found "that the trial 
court's conclusion is proper that the police created the incommuni-
cado environment because they knew defendant would not submit to 
interrogation while in the presence of his mother and stepfather, 
which was a clear violation of Miranda." Id. at 333 (emphasis in 
original). The police here had identical concerns that David 
Streeter would not submit to interrogation after consultation with 
an attorney. They therefore held David incommunicado until he 
broke down and talked. David should have been afforded an 
opportunity to use the telephone and consult with his attorney. 
Instead, his will was broken and he was coerced into making 
incriminating statements. These statements must be suppressed. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT DAVID STREETER KNOWINGLY, 
INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
[A]n accused's statements made after he has invoked his 
right to counsel and before counsel is made available to 
him are admissible if three conditions are satisfied. 
First, it must be the accused, not the law enforcement 
officers, who initiates the conversations in which the 
incriminating statements are made. Second, the 
prosecution must show, on the motion to suppress, a 
knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. 
Third, the accused's statements must be shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence to have been voluntarily 
made. 
State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985) (citing Oregon v. 
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983) 
(plurality opinion), Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 1101 S.Ct. 
29 
1880, 16 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), and State v. Newton, 682 P.2d 295 
(Utah 1984)) . 
But even if a conversation taking place after 
the accused has "expressed his desire to deal with the 
police only through counsel," is initiated by the 
accused, where reinterrogation follows, the burden 
remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent 
events indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to 
have counsel present during the interrogation. 
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044, 103 S.Ct. at , 77 L.Ed.2d at 412. 
A. THE POLICE FAILED TO RE-MIRANDIZE 
DAVID STREETER. 
The record is undisputed that David Streeter was not re-
Mirandized prior to the second interrogation. R. 205:23-206:7, 
217:14-23. This fact is critical to a complete understanding and 
review of the extent to which David Streeter understood his rights. 
Re-Mirandizing should be required prior to all subsequent 
interrogations. Hawaii requires that officers re-Mirandize 
defendants at subsequent interrogations despite proper warnings at 
prior interrogations. State v. Nelson, 748 P.2d 365 (Haw. 1987). 
In Nelson, defendant was Mirandized and interrogated on Christmas 
day concerning certain harassing phone calls. Two days later, 
officers went to defendant's house and interrogated him concerning 
other phone calls. After noting that "'the protections which the 
United States Supreme Court enumerated in Miranda have an 
independent source in the Hawaii Constitution's privilege against 
self incrimination.'", Nelson, 748 P.2d at 369 (quoting State v. 
Santiago, 492 P.2d 657, 664 (Haw. 1971), the Hawaii Supreme Court 
ruled: 
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This was hardly "the same interrogation" conducted on 
Christmas Day. The officers had new information regard-
ing different offenses, and it was incumbent upon them to 
"Mirandize" the defendant again. 
Nelson, 748 P.2d at 372. Utah should adopt a similar rule under 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution. 
Commonwealth v. Coplin, 612 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. App. 1993) 
involved the issue of whether Miranda warnings given at the time of 
arrest carried over to a subsequent interrogation where incomplete 
warnings were given.19 There was no evidence that the earlier 
warnings were understood. The court reversed, holding that the 
prior warnings were inadequate to show a knowing and intelligent 
waiver at a later time. 
In this case, David may have understood his rights when 
they were first read to him. However, his understanding was 
tempered and colored by subsequent conduct of the police. At the 
second interrogation, the only warnings given were as follows: 
TC: Do you recall earlier that I had advised you of 
your rights? 
DS: Yes [.] 
TC: And after being advised of your rights you said 
that you wanted to talk to a lawyer? 
DS: Yes [.] 
TC: Now is it your desire and you come forth 
voluntarily that you want to talk to me now? 
DS: Yes [.] 
TC: And you want to talk to me without a lawyer? 
19The accused was not told that anything he said could be used 
against him in a court of law. The incomplete warnings given David 
Streeter at the second interrogation share this same flaw. 
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DS: Yes [.] 
TC: Go ahead. 
Transcript p. 3. In the totality of the circumstances, it is true 
that David was advised of his rights, but his invocation of those 
rights was not honored. Additionally, he was threatened by 
Detective Cowley. The State has made no showing that David's 
statements were not the product and result of these prior threats. 
As in Coplin, the prior Miranda warnings cannot carry over to the 
subsequent interrogation. At minimum, David should have been re-
Mirandized.20 
B. POLICE MISCONDUCT NEGATED ANY UNDER-
STANDING DAVID STREETER MAY HAVE HAD 
CONCERNING HIS CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS. 
At the second interrogation, David Streeter's knowledge 
of his rights was limited to his prior receipt of Miranda warnings, 
as colored by Detective Cowley's threats and failures to honor 
David's rights. 
David invoked his right to counsel and silence, 
Transcript p. 1, but his invocation was ignored. After stating 
20The trial court improperly relied on this incorporation of 
the prior Miranda warnings to support his finding that David made 
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights. See 
Memorandum Decision, R. 112-116 at 115 ("The defendant made a 
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel. In reading 
lines 1 through 8 of page 3 of the transcript of the interrogation 
it is evident that defendant understood that he had a right to 
counsel and that he elected to proceed without benefit of 
counsel."). As explained in POINT I.D., supra at 23, this 
purported "waiver" is the direct product of the prior taint 
resulting from Detective Cowley's misconduct. 
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that he might answer some questions but wanted to reserve the right 
to terminate the interrogation, Transcript p. 2, the officer 
threatened David rather than confirm and reaffirm his Miranda right 
to terminate interrogation. Only after three additional 
invocations of his right to counsel and silence was the 
interrogation finally terminated. 
David was informed of his right to counsel, but the 
police did nothing to secure him that right. David stated "I want 
my lawyer here, all you have to do is call my mom and he will be 
down here," Transcript p. 2, but he was neither provided access to 
a telephone, nor was a call to his mother to secure counsel made on 
his behalf by the police. 
After being threatened by Detective Cowley, David was 
placed in a holding cell, and kept incommunicado. Barely 18, 
living at home, and with a fifth grade reading level, David's will 
was overborne. After two hours, he broke down and asked to talk to 
the detective. 
C. UNDER THE TOTALITY OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES, DAVID STREETER DID 
NOT KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY, AND 
VOLUNTARILY WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL. 
Findings of waiver must be based on the particular facts 
and circumstances of each case, including the "background, 
experience, and conduct of the accused." Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 
101 S.Ct. at , 68 L.Ed.2d at 385 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 
U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). That David 
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may have been particularly susceptible to the threats and coercion 
of Detective Cowley does not in any fashion assist the State in 
showing that David made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
waiver. 
The Miranda warnings David received prior to his first 
interrogation were vitiated by the subsequent police misconduct. 
David was aware of the rote litany, but was further aware that the 
police were not going to help him obtain his attorney or release 
him until he made a statement. When he attempted to confirm that 
he could terminate interrogation, the police responded with 
threats. At the conclusion of this travesty, David's knowledge of 
his rights was that they existed in a vacuum, in name only, and 
would not be honored by the police. 
Where an accused accedes to questioning only after it 
becomes apparent that his request for counsel is going to be 
denied, to the extent this may even be considered a waiver it 
cannot be said to be voluntary. State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 
226 (Minn. 1988) . David only asked to speak to the detective after 
his rights were not honored, he was threatened, and placed 
incommunicado in a holding cell. The police made clear that his 
right to an attorney would not be honored. David's will was 
overborne, and he acceded to further questioning. His statements 
must be suppressed. 
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CONCLUSION 
No system worth preserving should have to fear that if an 
accused is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will 
become aware of, and exercise, these rights. If the 
exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the 
effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there 
is something very wrong with that system. 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, 84 S. Ct. 1758, , 12 
L.Ed.2d 977, 985-6 (1964) (footnotes omitted, emphasis in 
original). 
The police misconduct in this case, and the continuing 
taint of that misconduct in compelling David Streeter to make 
incriminating statements, requires that David Streeter's statements 
be suppressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JJ^L day of July, 1993. 
ROBERT'K. HElNEMAN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM A 
Transcript of September 22, 1990 Interrogations 
O.K. I'm Detective Cowley vith the police department and 
what it your name? 
David 
David what? 
David Streeter 
Spell you last name for me. 
Streeter 
What is your date of birth? 
09-14-72 
And you address? 
3551 South 7200 ffest 
Your home phone number? 
250-9546 
Have you been advised of your rights? 
Yes 
I'm going to.do it again. You have the right to remain 
silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you 
in a court of lav. You have the right to talk to a lawyer 
and have him present vith vou while you are being 
questioned. if you cannot arrora a nire a lawyer, one -will 
be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you 
wish. You can decide at anytime to exercise these rights 
and not answer any questions or make any statements, po you 
understand these rights that I have explained to you? 
Yes 
Having these rights in mind do you wish to speak with us now 
without an attorney present? 
No 
You don't want to talk to us? 
I don't know why I am really even in here. All I vas doing 
was sleeping over at my friends lavn last night and the cops 
just come ripping in the yard and arrested us and 
Well we have a bunch of questions we would like to ask you, 
would you be willing to answer those questions without a 
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lawyer present. 
DS: Maybe some of them. It just depends cause I really don't 
knov vhy I am here. 
TC: So does that mean ve can ask you questions and you vill 
ansver the ones you want to answer? 
DS: Yes I have the right to stop at any time though. 
TC: Well, I'll tell you right now that if you take that attitude 
with us. 
DS: Well I ainft trying tc 
TC: Because we have all the witnesses we need and we know who 
has done what and who has done what to who. So I want the 
truth out of you and I want it now. Now do you understand 
that? 
DS: Yes 
TC: Who were you with tonight 
DS: J.D. 
TC: Who else? 
DS: Some of my friends, I want my lawyer here, all you have to 
do is call my mom and he vill be down here. 
TC: You vant your attorney? 
DS: Yes 
TC: And you donft vant to talk to us? 
DS: Yes 
TC: O.K. 
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TC; Do you recall earlier that .I had advised you of your rights? 
DS: Yes 
TC: And after being advised of your rights you said that you 
wanted to talk to a lawyer? 
DS: Yes 
TC: Now is it your desire and you come forth voluntarily that 
you want to talk to me now? 
DS: Yes 
TC: And you want to talk to me without a lawyer? 
DS: Yes 
TC: Go ahead* 
DS: Just tell the story. 
TC: Tell the story. 
DS: O.K. we was just coming home from that party... 
TC: Now hold on, you say "ve" who is "we". 
DS: It was me and Bart in the car-. ,In :his car., 
TC: Now does Bart go 'by Kevin. 
DS: Yes 
TC: And who's car is that? 
DS: Bart's car, and some guy, he had his briahts on, Bart did, 
and that guy in front of us. 
TC: Which direction were you going? 
DS: West 
TC: So you were going West on? 
DS: On 41, so^ then-he--pulled over-and. let us go ahead of him and* 
then" he' pulled- behind- us~ and- turned- his brights "on'! 
So we—pulled over - and- let - him go in front of«-us—>and we-^ 
•pulled-down the.. street~andr then-he-started toget out-of his* 
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car and so ve jumped out of our car and he got back in his 
and I smacked the window. 
TC: With vhat? 
DS: My hand, and then (inaud) 
TC: You donft knov vho they vere? 
DS: No 
TC: Did you ever kick the car? 
DS: No, I didn't kick the car. And then he drove away and then 
ve vas going back to my house and ve drove by '41 and ve got 
back from 41 and vent to 72 and he. vas at the 7-11 and he 
started saying shit to us so— ve pulled over vent back and 
walked up to him. 
TC: So after the occurrence of hitting the car and kicking the 
car, then he left. Then you left right after him? 
DS: No, about 5 minutes. 
TC: So, on your vay to your house you sav. 
DS: Yes, ve got back on 41 and he vas at the 7-11. 
TC: You sav the station .vagon..at_the 7-11? 
DS: .Yes,, and they started yelling- shit at us* 
TC: Which 7-11 vere you at? 
DS: The one on 4100 and 6400. 
TC: So you drove by and you sav the car there? 
DS: And he started yelling shit at us and so ve pulled over and 
walked up there. 
TC: Where did you pull over at? 
DS: Just on 4100. 
TC: So you didnft pull into the 7-11 parking lot? 
DS: And he had a hammer and he. said "Nov I can kick your guys 
ass", something to that effect. So he vas coming at us and 
so I picked a rock..up. and threv it at him. 
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TC: Hov big was the rock? 
DS: Just a little bigger than a golf ball. 
BS: Bigger that a golf ball and smaller than a soft ball? 
DS: Xes; a lot smaller than a soft ball, smaller than a 
baseball. 
TC: So you picked up a rock, where did you get the rock from? 
DS: Just on the ground, I just reached down and grabbed it. 
TC: And then you threw it and hit him in the head. 
DS: I guess it nit mm in the head, I don't know. ALJ L was 
really going tc do. was scare him, try to get him to-bacK-. up 
with the hammerc 
TC: Then what happened? 
DS: cl guess he hit Bart with that hammer 
TC: Then what happened? 
DS: Then the. girl jumped on me*. 
TC: What did they do? 
DS: Wrestled me to the. ground, and then I got up and:.I got that 
guy off Bart and I said "let's get out of here". 
TC: Did you do anything else to that guy besides throw a rock at 
him and hit him. 
DS: I might have-kicked hinr. 
TC: Where? 
DS: In the chest (inaud) 
TC: Was he laying on the ground when you did that? 
DS: He vas on top or sarr~ 
TC: Did you do anything else. 
DS: No 
TC: You didn't hit him in the head and chest and you didn't grab 
a rock and hit him in the head with a rock. 
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DS: Oh, I .hit him when I threw that rock the first time.-
TC: But you didn't hit him with a rock after that? 
OS: No 
TC: But you didn't hit him in the head. 
OS: No, (inaud) 
TC: Did you hit him with anything else? 
OS: No 
TC: Then what happened? 
DS: We took off and went back to my house and sat there and 
everybody was leavihc and Duscin-and-Roiuand_Nerd .theyL.va% 
leavina. and_L auess they-went- to_the J. U to; get.gas* I 
don't know* We was all getting ready for bed and the next 
thing you know Nerd-was!knocking, atl-the.door--; 
TC: Who is Nerd? 
DS: Nerd is Cody. 
DS: And he says "some guy started a fight down there with 
Dustin". 
TC: Down where? 
DS: The 7-11. 
TC: Which one? 
DS: 3500 and 7200. 
TC: Go ahead. 
DS: So we ran down there-;... 
TC: Now you say "we", who is "we"? 
DS: Me and J.D.-and Nerd vas with us, 
TC: So Cody. 
DS: And that is all that was in the house. 
TC: What about Kevin? 
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DS: 9hr yes\, Bart too. 
TC: So you guys went down to the 7-11 to help Dustin out? 
DS: Yes 
TC: Then what happened? 
DS: There were tvo guys, chasing him. around the parking lot* 
TC: Chasing Dustin? 
DS: Yes and I don't know wnere Ron was. Ron wasn't helping him. 
And the: one run UD-to Bart, Dusting was backing .upland .Bart. 
walked up by him land one-grabbed.'.Bart and threw him against 
.the car and Dustin came ftom-ground the side "£ him and• 
punched him .and dropped him. 
TC: With one punch? 
DS: Yes 
TC: And he fell down on the ground and this was 'in the parking 
lot of 7-11. 
DS: Yes 
TC: Then what happened? 
DS: Then the, other one had Jay by the hair and-so we ran up* 
there* and got him off and~ve just took "off-
TC: Who kicked this guy on the ground? 
DS: I kicked him Dnce. 
TC: Where? 
DS: In the head. 
TC: Did you see anyone else kick him? 
DS: No 
TC; So after Dustin hit him and this guy fell down on the ground 
you kicked him in the head? 
DS: Yes 
TC: And you didn't see anyone else kick him? 
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DS: I was getting out of there, all I did was vent and got that 
guy off Jay and ve iooJc off runnina baci ta mv tious^ 
TC: Who is "ve"? 
DS: Me and Jay and .Bart> Bart was probably already at my house. 
I just told them to get out of there. 
TC: Who had the gun? 
DS: Jay had a BE guir. 
TC: When did he get that? 
DS: Probably after ve vent back to the house/ I didn't even knov 
he had it cause I took off, I vas getting out of there I 
didn't vant nothing to do vith cops. 
TC: So you vent back to your house and did you guys come back to 
the 7-11 again after J.D. got the gun? 
DS: No, the- Jeep came: up by my house- from the parking lot vith. a 
crovbai and. vas going to kill Dustin, 
TC: From vhat parking lot? 
DS: Ream's, so ve all rar >vei there and 
TC: So you ran over to the Ream's parking lot to help Dustin? 
DS: Just to see vhat vas going on because all ve could hear vas 
Dustin saying "he/s got a crowbar" or something. 
TC: And that's when J.D. had the gun. 
DS: Yes, cause vhen I got over there that is vhen J.D. had the 
gun. 
TC: Who's gun does that belong to? 
DS: It vas lay's. 
TC: Where is the gun now? 
DS: I have-no idea. 
TC: You don't knov vhat happened to it? 
DS: No, I vas getting out of there. I didn't want nothing to do 
with it. 
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TC: What did you see J.D. do with the gun, did you see him point 
it at anybody? 
OS: He just had it in his hand, he didn't point it at anybody. 
TC: Did he point it at anybody, did he shoot at anybody? 
DS: No, it wasn't loaded (inaud) 
TC: Then after the altercation in the parking lot at Ream's what 
happened? 
DS: That guy left and then ve left and ve vent over to Jay's 
house* 
TC: So you didn't go back dovn by the 7-11 to check on this 
other guy. So you don't knov what happened to him? But JCQXE 
kicked him once in- the^head while ie- was >E
 :the-ground? 
DS: He was on .his way dovn: 
TC: Did you see anybody else kick him or hit him on the ground, 
how about Kevin? 
DS: The only time I saw Bart was when that guy had him up 
against the car and Dustin smacked that guy and he was on 
his was down and _I kicked him and that is the last time X 
seen Kevin, (inaud) 
TC: Going back to the first incident at the 7-11 on 6400 West 
how many times* did you hit and kick that guy? 
DS: 2 kicked lim one time and I don.'fc even think I hit him 
TC: JCou didn'tr hit him with your fist? 
DS: Ho: 
TC: So you only hit him once with a rock and that was in the 
head? 
DS: I guess so 
TC: And then you kicked him in the head? 
DS: No 
TC: ffhere d id you kick him? 
DS: Across the sLmJbLs-' 
Page 10 
Interview with David Streeter 
TC: Across the shoulder, was he laying on the ground when you 
kicked him? 
DS: He was on too of Bart. 
TC: What did you see Bart do to him? 
DS: (inaud) I didn't have a chance, them girls jumped on my 
quick. 
TC: What did they do? 
DS: Just wrestled me down. 
TC: What did vou do to the airls? 
DS: Just Dushed them away and told them to back off. 
TC: rou didn't hit them with your fist or kick them? 
DS: No, I wouldn't hit a girl. 
TC: Xou didn't hit them with a rock. 
DS: No, that lady came after me with a hammer. 
TC: Did vou hit her„with a rock? 
DS: No 
TC: Did you throw. a - r o c J c a t her? 
DS: No 
TC: You are s u r e ? 
DS: I'm p o s i t i v e . 
